As special types of factorization of finite groups, logarithmic signature and cover have been used as the main components of cryptographic keys for secret key cryptosystems such as PGM and public key cryptosystems like 1 , 2 , and 3 . Recently, Svaba et. al proposed a revised 3 encryption scheme with greater security. Meanwhile, they put forward an idea of constructing signature schemes on the basis of logarithmic signatures and random covers. In this paper, we firstly design a secure digital signature scheme based on logarithmic signatures and random covers. In order to complete the task, we devise a new encryption scheme based on 3 cryptosystems.
Introduction
With the interdisciplinary development of information science, physical science, and biological science, a lot of new technology appeared in the field of cryptography and has made new progress. The new branches of cryptography mainly consist of quantum cryptography, chaotic cryptography, DNA cryptography, and so forth. The security of quantum cryptography is based on the Heisenberg uncertainty principle. Quantum cryptography is the only one that can realize unconditional security at present [1] [2] [3] [4] . Matthews [5] firstly applied chaos theory in cryptography and proposed a chaotic stream cipher scheme based on revised logistic map. From then on, chaotic cryptography has attracted wide attention [6, 7] . Most of the researches in chaotic cryptography focus on secret key cryptography. With the recent constructions due to Wang et al. [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] , chaos-based public key cryptographic protocols come to us. DNA cryptography, which utilizes DNA computing, is a new branch of cryptography in recent years [15, 16] . Using the high storage density and high parallelism of DNA molecular, DNA cryptography can realize the encryption, authentication, signature, and so forth [17] .
Meanwhile, cryptographers look forward to applying new intractable mathematical problems in classical cryptography. Currently, most public cryptographic primitives are based on the perceived intractability of certain mathematical problems in very large finite abelian groups [18] . Prominent hard problems consist of the problem of factoring large integers, the discrete logarithm problem over a finite field or an elliptic curve, and so forth. However, due to quantum algorithms for factoring integer and solving the discrete logarithm problem, most known public-key cryptosystems will be insecure when quantum computers become practical. Therefore, it is an imminent work to design effective cryptographic schemes which can resist quantum attacks. Actually, since the 1980s, several experts have been trying to design new cryptography schemes based on difficult problems in group theory. In 1985, Wagner and Magyarik [19] proposed an approach to designing public-key cryptosystems based on groups and semigroups with undecidable word problem. In 2000, Ko et al. [20] developed the theory of braid-based cryptography based on the hardness of the conjugator search problem (CSP) in braid groups. In 2004, Eick and Kahrobaei [21] proposed a new cryptosystem based on polycyclic groups. In 2005, Shpilrain and Ushakov [22] suggested that Thompson's group may be a good platform for constructing public-key cryptosystems. Recently, Kahrobaei et al. [23] proposed a public key exchange on the basis of matrices over group rings. Meanwhile, an active branch of noncommutative cryptography based on the hardness of group factorization problem has achieved great success during the last two decades. In 1986, 2 Mathematical Problems in Engineering Magliveras [24] proposed a symmetric cryptosystem based on a special type of factorization of finite groups named logarithmic signatures for finite permutation groups. Then, the algebraic properties of logarithmic signatures and cryptosystem were specifically discussed in [25, 26] . In 2002, Magliveras et al. [27] Our main contribution is to devise a digital signature scheme based on random covers and logarithmic signatures. In this process, we also construct a secure and more efficient encryption scheme based on 3 cryptosystems. The rest of contents are organized as follows. Necessary preliminaries are given in Section 2. In Section 3, we specifically describe a new encryption scheme and give corresponding security analysis. In Section 4, we propose a digital signature scheme based on random covers and logarithmic signatures; The related comparisons and illustrations are presented in Section 5. 
Preliminaries
, denotes the element ∑ =1 in the group ring Z . Definition 1 (cover and logarithmic signature [18, 27] ). Sup-
Let be a subset of . Then is
(ii) a logarithmic signature for (or ) if = 1 for every ∈ ( ∈ ).
The sequences are called the blocks; the vector ( 1 , . . . , ) with = | | is the type of and the length of is defined to be ( ) = ∑ =1 .
More generally, if = [ 1 , 2 , . . . , ] is a logarithmic signature (cover) for , then each element ∈ can be expressed uniquely (at least one way) as a product of the form [18] 
for ∈ . is called tame (factorizable) if the factorization above can be achieved in polynomial in the width of .
Definition 2 (cover (logarithmic signature) mappings [35] 
Then the surjective (bijection) mapping : Z → induced by is
where
MST 3 Cryptosystems and Suzuki 2-Groups.
In [18] , Lempken et al. utilized logarithmic signatures and random covers to construct a generic 3 encryption scheme. In this scheme, the public key consists of a tame logarithmic signature as well as some random numbers, and the secret key is composed of a random cover and a sandwich transformation of the cover [27] . The intractability assumptions of this scheme are group factorization problem on nonabelian groups.
Furthermore, motivated by attacks in [31] , Svaba and van Trung devised an enhanced version of the generic scheme [34] named 3 cryptosystems. In this scheme, they introduced a secret homomorphism to mask the secret logarithmic signature with a transformation of a random cover. Meanwhile, they proposed a new setup with random encryption.
Until now, the only instantiation of 3 cryptosystems is a Suzuki 2-group of order 2 with = 2 ( ≥ 3) [18, 34] .
From [34] , the Suzuki 2-group of order 2 can be denoted by ( , ), where is an automorphism of F with an odd order. Moreover, the group ( , ) can be represented by a matrix group and
is a 3 × 3 matrix over F . Hence, is of order 2 and the center Z( ) = { (0, ) | ∈ }. Besides, to store the group Mathematical Problems in Engineering 3 elements conveniently, ( , ) can be denoted by ( , , ), so the product of two elements in group is
and the computation of the product just requires a single multiplication and four additions in F .
Furthermore, the inverse of an element in group is
and it also requires a single multiplication and one addition in F . If = ( , ) ∈ and , ∈ , then and can be denoted by ⋅ and ⋅ , respectively. Hence, = ( ⋅ , ⋅ ), where ⋅ and ⋅ are the corresponding projections of along the first and second coordinates.
Building Block: A New MST 3 Encryption Scheme
Through comparison and analysis, we find that it is rather difficult to devise signature schemes based on the two 3 encryption schemes [18, 34] . Therefore, in order to complete the task, we design a new encryption scheme based on logarithmic signatures and random covers. In our scheme, the original secret key becomes a component of public key, and the encryption process is also simplified. Meanwhile, compared with original schemes, our scheme has a bit improvement in efficiency.
Description of the Scheme Key Generation
Input: a large group = ( , ), = 2 .
Output: a public key [ , , ] with corresponding private key [ , ( 0 , . . . , )].
(1) Choose a tame logarithmic signature
) of the same type as for a certain subset of such that 1 , . . . , ⊆ \ Z, where ∈ , ( )⋅ ∈ F \ {0}, and ( )⋅ ∈ F . Output: a ciphertext ( 1 , 2 ) of the message .
(1) Choose a random ∈ Z |Z| .
(2) Compute
Decryption
Input: a ciphertext pair ( 1 , 2 ) and the private key
Output: the message ∈ Z corresponding to ciphertext ( 1 , 2 ).
Correctness
For ∈ Z and ∈ Z |Z| , we have
then using −1 we can recover the random number by
Consequently, using 1 we can recover message by
Security Analysis

Attack on Private Key. (a)
In general, the adversary tries to obtain and ( 0 , ) from the equation
where ∈ Z |Z| , 1 = ( ) ⋅ , 2 = ( ), and
The adversary mainly attempts to compute enough values ( ) in order to construct using the corresponding conclusion in [27] . If is of type ( 1 , 2 , . . . , ), then one can construct a logarithmic signature equivalent to by using selected values ( ), where
. . , } be a collection of random numbers chosen by the adversary. Then
where 1 = ( ) ⋅ , 2 = ( ), and
Note that in the equation above, ( 1 ) −1 and 2 are known and ( ) ∈ Z; then we have
Since ∈ \ Z, there are (1 ≤ ≤ , 1 ≤ ≤ ) for , ∈ Z. So for the first block of , we have 
We can get that = 1 = 1 for all = 1, . . . , . If we denote = , then
Let ( ) = 1 1 2 2 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , * := ( * ), and
Since * is tame, so the adversary can use forgery secret key [ * , ( * 0 , . . . , * )] to recover the random number . Meanwhile, from conclusions in [31] , as there are = | /Z| possible choices for 0 in 0 Z, the complexity for this attack is O( ). Since the center Z of Suzuki 2-group has a large order , so the attack is computationally infeasible.
Attack on Ciphertext OW (onewayness).
In the stage of encryption, from the equation 1 = ( ) ⋅ , we can get that = ( ) −1 ⋅ 1 . Hence, if the adversary wants to recover message , he either directly seeks the random number or recovers from ( ). However, since is large enough and is a one-way map, so the attack is computationally infeasible.
IND (indistinguishability).
Although we cannot give a formal proof on the indistinguishability of the scheme, we would like to analyse it in a heuristic manner. Suppose that ( * 1 , * 2 ) is the ciphertext of 0 or 1 , where * 1 = ( ) ⋅ , * 2 = ( ), = 0 or 1, 0 , and 1 are randomly selected by the adversary. Then we can analyse the following two cases:
Since and are randomly selected, and they admit the same distribution, thus, and are statistically indistinguishable for the adversary. It can be denoted by ≈ .
Meanwhile, since and are both one-way maps, so we can get that ( ) ≈ ( ) and ( ) ≈ ( ). Besides, since
A Digital Signature Scheme Based on the New MST 3 Cryptosystem
In this section, we utilize the encryption scheme above to construct a digital signature scheme based on random covers and logarithmic signatures.
Description of the Scheme Key Generation
Input: a large group = ( , ) and = 2 . Output: signature = ( 1 , 2 ).
(1) Randomly select ∈ Z and compute a random element = −1 0 ∈ . Let 2 = , 1 = ( , ).
Verification
Input: the message ∈ , signature = ( 1 , 2 ), and public key [ , , , ] . Output: 0 or 1.
(1) Compute = ( 1 ) ⋅ 2 and = ( , ( 1 ) ⋅ ( 2 )).
(2) If = , output 1; otherwise output 0.
Correctness. For a given message ∈ ,
Meanwhile
Hence,
Consequently, we have
Security Analysis
Attack on Private Key. (a)
Compared with the encryption scheme in Section 3, we add a secure hash function in the signature scheme. Hence, analysis of the security of the signature scheme is similar to that in the encryption scheme.
In the signature scheme, the goal of the general attack is also to determine and ( 0 , ) from the equation
where 1 = ( ) ⋅ , 2 = ( ), and ( 1 ) −1 ∈ Z. Let { 1 , 2 , . . . , } be a collection of random numbers chosen by the adversary. Then we have
As described in Section 3, there are 2 − different solutions; the success probability of the adversary is 1/ ( − 1).
(b) In our signature scheme, we construct a ciphertext pair ( 1 , 2 ) then obtain the signature = ( 1 , 2 ) by decrypting the pair ( 1 , 2 ) . Therefore, analysis of the equivalent key is similar to that in Section 3. In this attack, an adversary mainly wants to utilize equivalent secret key [ * , ( 
Let ( ) = 1 1 2 2 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ and
Consequently, the complexity for this attack is O( ). While, due to the center Z of Suzuki 2-group having a large order , so the attack is computationally infeasible. Since is large enough, this attack is computationally infeasible.
Unforgeability. Suppose that Eve attempts to forge a message-signature pair (
* , * 1 , * 2 ) such that ( * 1 ) ⋅ * 2 = ( * , ( * 1 ) ⋅ ( * 2 )) .(30
Comparisons and Illustrations
Comparisons.
In this subsection, we compare 3 encryption scheme in [34] and our encryption scheme on number of basic operations. Then, we make further efforts to show the performance of our signature scheme. We summarize the number of basic operations (addition (ADD), multiplication (MULT), exponentiation with (EXP( )), etc.). Table 1 shows the number of operations required for 3 scheme and our scheme. The corresponding operations are namely addition (ADD), multiplication (MULT), exponentiation with (EXP( )), generation of m-bit random R (PRNG) [36] , and factorization of ( ) ∈ Z with respect to a logarithmic signature using the Algorithms 9, 10, and 11 (FACTOR) [34] . Table 2 presents the number of operations required for public key and secret key. The corresponding operations are, namely, addition (ADD) and multiplication (MULT) generation of -bit random (PRNG) [36] .
For example, when = 26, V = 52, the number of multiplication for secret key is 1792 and the number of generation of -bit random is 760; when = 23, V = 44, the number of multiplication for secret key is 2688 and the number of generation of -bit random is 948; when = 20, V = 58, the number of multiplication for secret key is 4864 and the number of generation of -bit random is 712. Table 3 indicates the performance of the signature scheme. Table 4 indicates parameter size in our schemes. Here, we mainly analyse the number of elements in Suzuki 2-group.
Remark 3.
In the community of cryptography based on chaos theory, a lot of efforts were focused on secret key cryptography in early years [5] [6] [7] . Recently, Wang et al. [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] made progress on building public key agreement protocols by using chaos theory. The corresponding schemes also have high efficiency and strong security. Being different from quantum cryptography, chaotic cryptography, and DNA cryptography, 3 cryptosystem is a public key cryptosystem of classical cryptography. The hardness of our encryption scheme is based on a type of intractable mathematical problem called group factorization problem. Meanwhile, our encryption scheme and signature scheme are efficient in classical computer.
A Toy Example.
In this subsection, we present a toy example of signing a random element ∈ F . In fact, our method is universal in the sense that it can be used to sign documents or realize authentication protocols based on images.
Key Generation
Input: a Suzuki 2-group = ( , ) with = 8, = 2 8 and = 2.
Output: public key [ , , , ] and private key
In general, let a pair ( , ) denote an element of group . For simplicity, we use a binary number of an element ∈ F to present (0, ) ∈ Z and a binary numbers pair to present ( , ) ∈ . 1 Compared with 3 scheme, our scheme reduces a step of multiplication with the element of the center Z in the stage of encryption. Thus, the number of (F 2 ADD) reduces once. 2 In the stage of decryption, our scheme reduces a step of inverse operation, a step of multiplication operation, and a F 2 EXP( ) operation, so the number of (F 2 ADD) reduces five times and (F 2 MULT) reduces twice. 
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. 4 For ∈ F , : → 2 is a Frobenius automorphism. Hence, can be reduced to a multiplication. 5 V represents the number of blocks before fusion.
(i) For simplicity, we use a one-way function as the hash function in our scheme. That is, : × → is given by
Actually, one can also use standard hash functions like SHA1 and so forth.
(ii) A factorizable logarithmic signature
(1) We first construct canonical logarithmic signature 
(ii) Compute 
